Sequential contracting with multiple principals
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Sequential contracting with multiple principals
zbMATH Open document ID: 1159.91009
author: A. Pavan
author: Giacomo Calzolari
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5530651
zbMATH Keywords: sequential common agency
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: contracts
zbMATH Keywords: endogenous types
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.07.003
OpenAlex ID: W3121648641
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5530651