Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Dynamic contracting with persistent shocks
zbMATH Open document ID: 1157.91405
author: Yuzhe Zhang
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B60
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 93E99
zbMATH DE Number: 5530655
zbMATH Keywords: persistence
zbMATH Keywords: principal-agent problem
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic control problem
zbMATH Keywords: efficiency lines
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.08.004
OpenAlex ID: W3126004840
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.004
DOI: 10.21034/WP.640
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5530655