Theories of coalitional rationality
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Theories of coalitional rationality
zbMATH Open document ID: 1158.91309
author: Attila Ambrus
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-03-20T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:3204917
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5530656
zbMATH Keywords: normal form games
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional agreements
zbMATH Keywords: coordination
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic foundations of solution concepts
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2154805931
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2007.03.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5530656