A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: A limit characterization of belief-free equilibrium payoffs in repeated games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1158.91320
author: Yuichi Yamamoto
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 5530661
zbMATH Keywords: repeated game
zbMATH Keywords: private monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: almost-perfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: belief-free equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: characterization
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.07.005
OpenAlex ID: W2088743496
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.07.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5530661