The role of optimal threats in auction design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The role of optimal threats in auction design
zbMATH Open document ID: 1158.91360
author: Nicolás Figueroa
author: Vasiliki Skreta
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-03-20T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5530666
zbMATH Keywords: externalities
zbMATH Keywords: optimal auctions
zbMATH Keywords: type-dependent outside options
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.11.006
OpenAlex ID: W2037016669
cites work: Multidimensional mechanism design for auctions with externalities
cites work: Participation constraints in adverse selection models
cites work: Countervailing incentives in agency problems
cites work: Bundling as an optimal selling mechanism for a multiple-good monopolist
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Bargaining under Asymmetric Information
cites work: Haggling over substitutes
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.11.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5530666