Strong price of anarchy
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strong price of anarchy
zbMATH Open document ID: 1156.91419
author: Nir Andelman
author: Michal Feldman
author: Yishay Mansour
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-03-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B52
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 5531213
zbMATH Keywords: strong equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: price of anarchy
zbMATH Keywords: strong price of anarchy
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions
zbMATH Keywords: congestion games
zbMATH Keywords: network formation
zbMATH Keywords: job scheduling
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2008.03.005
OpenAlex ID: W1972926214
Wikidata QID: Q92407013
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.03.005
DBLP publication ID: journals/geb/AndelmanFM09
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5531213