Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
zbMATH Open document ID: 1158.91364
author: Nathan C. Larson
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-03-24T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5531218
zbMATH Keywords: common value auction
zbMATH Keywords: differential information
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2007.07.010
OpenAlex ID: W3121931913
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2007.07.010
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5531218