Mutually acceptable courses of action
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Mutually acceptable courses of action
zbMATH Open document ID: 1166.91003
author: Joseph Greenberg
author: Sudheer Gupta
author: Xiao Luo
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-05T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper offers a game-theoretic framework that enables the analysis of situations whereby rational individuals with different beliefs and views of the world agree to a shared course of action. It introduces a mutually acceptable course of action, which can be viewed as an contract or a social norm that free rational individuals would be willing to follow for their own diverse reasons. It is shown that by varying the degree of completeness of the underlying course of action, the concept can be related to commonly used solutions, such as perfect equilibrium, perfect Bayesian equilibrium, self-confirming equilibrium, and rationalizable outcomes.
reviewed by: Klaus Ehemann
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 5550691
zbMATH Keywords: game theory
zbMATH Keywords: contract
zbMATH Keywords: social norm
zbMATH Keywords: action
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-008-0349-5
OpenAlex ID: W2119112198
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0349-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5550691