Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic complementarity in multi-stage games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1168.91013
author: Xavier Vives
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-05T00:00:00Z
review text: The author provides sufficient conditions for finite-horizon multistage game so that the value function is supermodular and contemporaneous equilibrium is increasing in state variables. These consumptions are the following: the current payoff of each player has the complementarity property in any pair of variables, the law of motion is increasing and supermodular in actions and state variables, the contemporaneous equilibrium is continuous and supermodular (in state variable), and payoffs and transition probability, and equilibrium satisfy convexity property.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5550693
zbMATH Keywords: Markov perfect equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: multistage game
zbMATH Keywords: \(n\)-player finite-horizon game
reviewed by: Anna Jaskiewicz
Wikidata QID: Q57388200
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-008-0354-8
OpenAlex ID: W3124167272
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0354-8
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5550693