Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Evolutionary game dynamics and the analysis of agent-based imitation models: the long run, the medium run and the importance of global analysis
zbMATH Open document ID: 1201.91014
author: Herbert Dawid
publication date: 2009-05-18T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A22
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 37N40
zbMATH DE Number: 5554458
zbMATH Keywords: imitation
zbMATH Keywords: stochastic stability
zbMATH Keywords: evolutionary stability
zbMATH Keywords: basins of attraction
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jedc.2007.01.002
OpenAlex ID: W2086364787
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JEDC.2007.01.002
published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5554458