Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Collusion as public monitoring becomes noisy: Experimental evidence
zbMATH Open document ID: 1159.91336
author: Masaki Aoyagi
author: Guillaume R. Fréchette
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/11094/3140
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5553094
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect public monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: collusion
zbMATH Keywords: cooperation
describes a project that uses: Stata
describes a project that uses: nbreg
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2132980272
cites work: Q3331506
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cites work: Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect Monitoring
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cites work: Switching Regression Models with Imperfect Sample Separation Information--With an Application on Cartel Stability
cites work: Optimal cartel trigger price strategies
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cites work: Q3996232
cites work: Q2995585
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.10.005
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5553094