Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Eliciting socially optimal rankings from unfair jurors
zbMATH Open document ID: 1159.91329
author: Pablo Amorós
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: E200610.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5553097
zbMATH Keywords: implementation theory
zbMATH Keywords: Nash equilibrium
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2004115884
cites work: The scholarship assignment problem
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cites work: A simple proof of Maskin's theorem on Nash implementation
cites work: Strategy Space Reduction in Maskin's Theorem: Sufficient Conditions for Nash Implementation
cites work: Divide-and-permute
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DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5553097