On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the genericity of full surplus extraction in mechanism design
zbMATH Open document ID: 1159.91373
author: Paulo Barelli
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5553102
zbMATH Keywords: full surplus extraction
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
zbMATH Keywords: universal beliefs space
zbMATH Keywords: common knowledge
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2008.08.006
OpenAlex ID: W2036930562
cites work: Q5560061
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic Model
cites work: On the Generic (Im)Possibility of Full Surplus Extraction in Mechanism Design
cites work: Formulation of Bayesian analysis for games with incomplete information
cites work: Attractors of iterated function systems and Markov operators
cites work: Q3874454
cites work: Continuity in auction design
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2008.08.006
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5553102