Reputation and exogenous private learning
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Reputation and exogenous private learning
zbMATH Open document ID: 1159.91323
author: Thomas Wiseman
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-05-12T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
zbMATH DE Number: 5553105
zbMATH Keywords: reputation
zbMATH Keywords: chain store game
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: noisy signals
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.jet.2009.01.005
OpenAlex ID: W2079754130
cites work: Reputation with equal discounting in repeated games with strictly conflicting interests
cites work: Common Learning
cites work: Reputation and Equilibrium Selection in Games with a Patient Player
cites work: Maintaining a Reputation when Strategies are Imperfectly Observed
cites work: Reputation and imperfect information
cites work: Predation, reputation, and entry deterrence
cites work: The chain store paradox
cites work: A Partial Folk Theorem for Games with Unknown Payoff Distributions
DOI: 10.1016/J.JET.2009.01.005
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5553105