Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Repeated games with voluntary information purchase
zbMATH Open document ID: 1161.91316
author: Andres Perea
author: János Flesch
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A20
zbMATH DE Number: 5562806
zbMATH Keywords: repeated games
zbMATH Keywords: Folk theorem
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect monitoring
zbMATH Keywords: costly monitoring
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1965042798
cites work: Q4296856
cites work: Communication in repeated games with costly monitoring.
cites work: The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information
cites work: Noncooperative Collusion under Imperfect Price Information
cites work: The folk theorem for repeated games with observation costs
cites work: Repeated Partnership Games with Imperfect Monitoring and No Discounting
cites work: An Example of a Repeated Partnership Game with Discounting and with Uniformly Inefficient Equilibria
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.015
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5562806