Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Equilibrium refinement vs. level-\(k\) analysis: An experimental study of cheap-talk games with private information
zbMATH Open document ID: 1161.91339
author: Toshiji Kawagoe
author: Hirokazu Takizawa
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-06-08T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A90
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A28
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5562812
zbMATH Keywords: cheap talk
zbMATH Keywords: refinement
zbMATH Keywords: level-\(k\) analysis
zbMATH Keywords: truth-bias
zbMATH Keywords: experiment
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2008.04.008
OpenAlex ID: W4235410568
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.008
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5562812