Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Strategic basins of attraction, the path dominance core, and network formation games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1161.91334
author: Frank H. jun. Page
author: Myrna Wooders
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-06-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: CAEPR2007-020.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A43
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B10
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91D30
zbMATH DE Number: 5562823
zbMATH Keywords: basins of attraction
zbMATH Keywords: network formation games
zbMATH Keywords: stable sets
zbMATH Keywords: path dominance core
zbMATH Keywords: Nash networks
zbMATH Keywords: coalitions in networks
zbMATH Keywords: rules of network formation
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3122362869
cites work: Markets with a Continuum of Traders
cites work: A Noncooperative Model of Network Formation
cites work: The theory of graphs. Translated from the 1958 French edition by Alison Doig.
cites work: Pairwise-stability and Nash equilibria in network formation
cites work: Farsighted coalitional stability
cites work: Farsighted stability in hedonic games
cites work: Stable networks
cites work: Q5817872
cites work: An Equilibrium-Point Interpretation of Stable Sets and a Proposed Alternative Definition
cites work: Farsightedly stable networks
cites work: Strong equilibrium in congestion games
cites work: Absorbing and generalized stable sets
cites work: Strongly stable networks
cites work: The evolution of social and economic networks.
cites work: A strategic model of social and economic networks
cites work: An admissible set occurring in various bargaining situations
cites work: Collective Choice Correspondences as Admissible Outcomes of Social Bargaining Processes
cites work: A game with no solution
cites work: The Structure of the Kernel of a Cooperative Game
cites work: The kernel and bargaining set for convex games
cites work: Farsightedness and cautiousness in coalition formation games with positive spillovers
cites work: Potential games
cites work: Cores of effectivity functions and implementation theory
cites work: Graphs and Cooperation in Games
cites work: The partnered core of an economy and the partnered competitive equilibrium
cites work: Networks and farsighted stability
cites work: A conjecture of Shapley and Shubik on competitive outcomes in the cores of NTU market games
cites work: The inner core of an \(n\)-person game
cites work: The partnered core of a game without side payments
cites work: Solutions of irreflexive relations
cites work: A class of games possessing pure-strategy Nash equilibria
cites work: The Core of an N Person Game
cites work: A dynamic solution concept for abstract games
cites work: Potential maximizers and network formation
cites work: A note on generalized stable sets
cites work: Q5844986
cites work: Coalitional stability under perfect foresight
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.05.003
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5562823