Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Hiring mechanisms, application costs and stability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1161.91428
author: Matteo Triossi
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-06-08T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10533/130650
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B74
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
zbMATH DE Number: 5562829
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W3124275701
cites work: Implementation of stable solutions to marriage problems
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.04.019
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5562829