The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The human side of mechanism design: a tribute to Leo Hurwicz and Jean-Jacque Laffont
zbMATH Open document ID: 1162.91456
author: Daniel McFadden
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2009-06-22T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B42
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B64
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5567037
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s10058-009-0075-x
OpenAlex ID: W2141352119
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DOI: 10.1007/S10058-009-0075-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5567037