On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On strategy-proof social choice correspondences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1163.91336
author: Shin Sato
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 2009-06-17T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: s00355-008-0304-1
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5565998
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W4251840127
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DOI: 10.1007/S00355-007-0285-5
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5565998