Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Consulting an expert with potentially conflicting preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1213.91054
author: Thomas Lanzi
author: Jérôme Mathis
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2009-06-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: cepcp.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 5566858
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2075303355
cites work: Secrecy, two-sided bias and the value of evidence
cites work: Persuasion games with higher-order uncertainty.
cites work: Robust inference in communication games with partial provability
cites work: Full revelation of information in sender-receiver games of persuasion
cites work: Strategic Information Revelation
cites work: Strategic Information Transmission with Verifiable Messages
cites work: The burden of proof in a game of persuasion
cites work: Eliciting information from multiple experts
cites work: Information transmission when the sender's preferences are uncertain.
DOI: 10.1007/S11238-007-9070-2
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5566858