Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Markov interactions in a class of dynamic games
zbMATH Open document ID: 1163.91325
author: Charles Figuières
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2009-06-19T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: DR2004-16 1.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A25
zbMATH DE Number: 5566870
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2000849271
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-008-9123-1
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5566870