On the foundation of stability
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On the foundation of stability
zbMATH Open document ID: 1185.91050
author: Xiao Luo
published in: Economic Theory
publication date: 2009-07-06T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A35
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5575947
zbMATH Keywords: stable sets
zbMATH Keywords: internal and external stability
zbMATH Keywords: ``rationality'' in strategic games
zbMATH Keywords: common knowledge
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s00199-008-0363-7
OpenAlex ID: W2081143019
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DOI: 10.1007/S00199-008-0363-7
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5575947