The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The possible and the impossible in multi-agent learning
zbMATH Open document ID: 1168.68507
author: H. Peyton Young
published in: Artificial Intelligence
publication date: 2009-07-09T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A26
zbMATH DE Number: 5576680
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: learning
zbMATH Keywords: dynamics
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.artint.2006.10.015
OpenAlex ID: W3125153207
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ARTINT.2006.10.015
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5576680