Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Optimal auctions for asymmetrically budget constrained bidders
zbMATH Open document ID: 1165.91385
author: Alexey Malakhov
author: Rakesh V. Vohra
published in: Review of Economic Design
publication date: 2009-07-13T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 1419.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5577648
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2027701916
cites work: Simultaneous ascending auctions with complementarities and known budget constraints
cites work: Expected revenue of all-pay auctions and first-price sealed-bid auctions with budget constraints
cites work: The optimal mechanism for selling to a budget-constrained buyer
cites work: Optimal auction with financially constrained buyers
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Ironing, Sweeping, and Multidimensional Screening
cites work: High bids and broke winners
DOI: 10.1007/S10058-008-0051-X
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5577648