Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Keep `hoping' for rationality: a solution to the backward induction paradox
zbMATH Open document ID: 1183.03011
author: Alexandru Baltag
author: Sonja Smets
author: Jonathan Alexander Zvesper
published in: Synthese
publication date: 2009-11-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03B42
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 68T27
zbMATH DE Number: 5625286
zbMATH Keywords: backward induction
zbMATH Keywords: dynamic logic
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic logic
zbMATH Keywords: public announcements
zbMATH Keywords: rationality
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11229-009-9559-z
OpenAlex ID: W2060336054
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DOI: 10.1007/S11229-009-9559-Z
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5625286