Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Expected utility consistent extensions of preferences
zbMATH Open document ID: 1186.91097
author: Burak Can
author: Bora Erdamar
author: M. Remzi Sanver
published in: Theory and Decision
publication date: 2009-11-04T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B16
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B06
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 5625308
zbMATH Keywords: preferences over sets
zbMATH Keywords: expected utility consistency
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: s11238-007-9066-y
OpenAlex ID: W2089617750
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DOI: 10.1007/S11238-007-9066-Y
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5625308