Games played in a contracting environment
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Games played in a contracting environment
zbMATH Open document ID: 1188.91078
author: J. Blot
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-11-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A80
zbMATH DE Number: 5632615
zbMATH Keywords: multi-party contracting
zbMATH Keywords: marginal contributions
zbMATH Keywords: perfect substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: perfect complements
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2008.12.004
OpenAlex ID: W2158632049
cites work: A folk theorem for one-shot Bertrand games
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cites work: Discontinuous Games and Endogenous Sharing Rules
DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2008.12.004
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5632615