Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Group incentive compatibility for matching with contracts
zbMATH Open document ID: 1180.91211
author: John William Hatfield
author: Fuhito Kojima
published in: Games and Economic Behavior
publication date: 2009-11-13T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B40
zbMATH DE Number: 5632639
zbMATH Keywords: matching
zbMATH Keywords: matching with contracts
zbMATH Keywords: substitutes
zbMATH Keywords: law of aggregate demand
zbMATH Keywords: stability
zbMATH Keywords: strategy-proofness
zbMATH Keywords: group strategy-proofness
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.geb.2009.01.007
OpenAlex ID: W2142558139
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DOI: 10.1016/J.GEB.2009.01.007
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5632639