Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Ignorance in a multi-agent setting
zbMATH Open document ID: 1179.91128
author: Samuel C. A. Pereira
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2009-12-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B44
zbMATH DE Number: 5650990
zbMATH Keywords: adverse selection
zbMATH Keywords: multi-agent contracts
zbMATH Keywords: information acquisition
zbMATH Keywords: mechanism design
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2009.08.016
OpenAlex ID: W1991992003
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DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.08.016
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5650990