Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Revenue comparison in common-value auctions: two examples
zbMATH Open document ID: 1179.91091
author: David A. Malueg
author: Ram Orzach
published in: Economics Letters
publication date: 2009-12-21T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B26
zbMATH DE Number: 5651037
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: second-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: revenue comparison
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: j.econlet.2009.07.018
OpenAlex ID: W1971699310
cites work: Standard Auctions with Financially Constrained Bidders
cites work: Dominance solvability of second-price auctions with differential information
cites work: Competitive bidding and proprietary information
cites work: Private value perturbations and informational advantage in common value auctions
cites work: Asymmetric Auctions
cites work: Comparing Auctions for Risk Averse Buyers: A Buyer's Point of View
cites work: A Theory of Auctions and Competitive Bidding
cites work: Optimal Auction Design
cites work: Note—Competitive Bidding with Asymmetric Information Reanalyzed
DOI: 10.1016/J.ECONLET.2009.07.018
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 5651037