On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: On a class of strictly nonmanipulable collective choice rules
zbMATH Open document ID: 0512.90007
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(83)90078-1
author: Taradas Bandyopadhyay
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3809263
zbMATH Keywords: strategy proof social choice
zbMATH Keywords: correspondence
zbMATH Keywords: coalitional nonmanipulability
zbMATH Keywords: collective choice rule
zbMATH Keywords: veto power
zbMATH Keywords: manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: misrepresentations of preferences
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(83)90078-1
OpenAlex ID: W2016824691
cites work: Threats, counter-threats and strategic manipulation for non-binary group decision rules
cites work: Manipulation and the Pareto rule
cites work: Strategy-Proofness and Social Choice Functions without Singlevaluedness
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3809263