Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
zbMATH Open document ID: 0512.90017
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(83)90113-8
author: Steven A. Matthews
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: 480.pdf
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 3809273
zbMATH Keywords: risk averse buyers
zbMATH Keywords: unobservable tastes
zbMATH Keywords: expected profit
zbMATH Keywords: selling indivisible units
zbMATH Keywords: first-price auction
zbMATH Keywords: incentive compatibility
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W2058783522
cites work: The Implementation of Social Choice Rules: Some General Results on Incentive Compatibility
cites work: Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result
cites work: Allocation Mechanisms and the Design of Auctions
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cites work: Optimal Auction Design
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3809273