Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Restricted domains, Arrow-social welfare functions and noncorruptible and nonmanipulable social choice correspondences: The case of private alternatives
zbMATH Open document ID: 0519.90013
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(83)90101-4
author: Zvi Ritz
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3823450
zbMATH Keywords: n-person social choice
zbMATH Keywords: n-person nondictatorial Arrow-type social welfare function
zbMATH Keywords: sets of restricted domains of preferences
zbMATH Keywords: private goods
zbMATH Keywords: nonmanipulable social choice correspondence
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(83)90101-4
OpenAlex ID: W2038827041
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3823450