Simple majority voting isn't special
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Simple majority voting isn't special
zbMATH Open document ID: 0566.90004
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(84)90086-6
author: Jerry S. Kelly
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1984-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Simple majority voting is compared with several other representative voting systems with respect to the frequency with which various anomalies occur. Whether strong or weak preferences are used, for each anomaly type simple majority voting yields neither highest nor lowest frequencies.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3904272
zbMATH Keywords: maximal alternative existence
zbMATH Keywords: probability of strategyproofness
zbMATH Keywords: Simple majority voting
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(84)90086-6
OpenAlex ID: W2051970113
cites work: Q5668657
cites work: Collective rationality versus distribution of power for binary social choice functions
cites work: Condorcet proportions and Kelly's conjectures
cites work: Condorcet's paradox
cites work: Voting Anomalies, the Number of Voters, and the Number of Alternatives
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3904272