The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The Condorcet criterion and committee selection
zbMATH Open document ID: 0568.90006
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90043-5
author: William V. Gehrlein
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Recent studies have evaluated election procedures on their propensity to select committees that meet a Condorcet criterion. The Condorcet criterion has been defined to use majority agreement from voters' preferences to compare the selected committee to all other committees. This study uses a different definition of the Condorcet criterion as defined on committees. The focus of the new definition is on candidates. That is, we consider majority agreement on each candidate in the selected committee as compared to each candidate not in the selected committee. This new definition of the Condorcet criterion allows for the existence of majority cycles on candidates within the selected committee. However, no candidate in the non-selected group is able to defeat any candidate in the selected committee by majority rule. Of particular interest is the likelihood that a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion exists. Attention is also given to the likelihood that various simple voting procedures will select a committee meeting this Condorcet criterion when one does exist.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3908105
zbMATH Keywords: committee selection
zbMATH Keywords: Condorcet criterion
zbMATH Keywords: existence of majority cycles
zbMATH Keywords: majority rule
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(85)90043-5
OpenAlex ID: W1976060283
cites work: An Analysis of Simple Voting Systems for Electing Committees
cites work: Majority efficiencies for simple voting procedures: Summary and interpretation
cites work: Single-stage election procedures for large electorates
cites work: Probabilities of election outcomes for large electorates
cites work: Integration over a simplex, truncated cubes, and Eulerian numbers
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908105