Silent-noisy marksmanship contest with random termination
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Silent-noisy marksmanship contest with random termination
zbMATH Open document ID: 0568.90102
DOI: 10.1007/BF00941074
published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: We consider a marksmanship contest in which Player I has one silent bullet, whereas Player II has one noisy bullet, the first contestant to hit his target wins, and the contest is to be terminated at a random time T with cdf H(t). The model is a silent-noisy version of our previous paper [ibid. 40, 379-396 (1983; Zbl 0494.90091)], and an extension of silent-noisy duel to nonzero-sum games of timing under an uncertain environment. It is shown that the uncertainty on the termination of the contest has influence on the equilibrium strategies and the equilibrium values, but the silent player has no advantages over the noisy one, in such a nonzero-sum model.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 3908201
zbMATH Keywords: strategically asymmetric information
zbMATH Keywords: nonzero-sum two-person games
zbMATH Keywords: decision under uncertainty
zbMATH Keywords: silent versus noisy duel
zbMATH Keywords: games of timing
author: Yoshinobu Teraoka
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Q3274599
cites work: Q5514145
cites work: On a noisy-silent-versus-silent duel with equal accuracy functions
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cites work: A two-person game of timing with random termination
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cites work: Q3926377
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908201