Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games. II
zbMATH Open document ID: 0568.90104
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(85)90045-9
author: Pradeep Dubey
author: Mamoru Kaneko
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: In part I of this paper [see ibid. 8, 111-139 (1984; Zbl 0552.90099)] we introduced extensive games with a non-atomic continuum of players. It was shown that the Nash plays (outcomes) are invariant of the information patterns on the game, provided that no player's unilateral change in moves can be observed by others. This led to an enormous reduction in the Nash plays of these games, as exemplified in the anti-folk theorem. Our concern in this sequel is to develop a finite version of these results.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3908203
zbMATH Keywords: epsilon-Nash equilibrium
zbMATH Keywords: replication of an extensive game
zbMATH Keywords: primitive Nash play
zbMATH Keywords: finite version
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(85)90045-9
OpenAlex ID: W4250804577
cites work: Information patterns and Nash equilibria in extensive games: I
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3908203