Intuitionistic truth
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Intuitionistic truth
zbMATH Open document ID: 0574.03047
DOI: 10.1007/BF00245993
author: Wlodzimierz Rabinowicz
published in: Journal of Philosophical Logic
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The paper considers formally slight variants of familiar logical laws that Kripke, Beth and others have related to intuitionistic truth. The author notes that they also hold for other kinds of 'epistemic accessibility' (p. 210), for example, d-verifiability on p. 198. In the tradition of the socalled theory of meaning the author stresses, on p. 191, that 'the whole realm of truth' is considered, and not merely mathematical statements. But he fails to stress that - as long as only familiar logical languages are considered, as in the present paper - this is a distinction without any difference (in validity).
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 03F50
zbMATH DE Number: 3916266
zbMATH Keywords: intuitionistic logic
zbMATH Keywords: epistemic accessibility
zbMATH Keywords: theory of meaning
reviewed by: Georg Kreisel
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: The foundations of mathematics. A study in the philosophy of science
cites work: Q4068683
cites work: Q3931272
cites work: Q4133603
cites work: A logical analysis of some value concepts
cites work: Intuitionism. An introduction
cites work: Q5509675
cites work: Meaning and proofs: on the conflict between classical and intuitionistic logic
full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00245993
OpenAlex ID: W4245136747
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3916266