Acyclic choice and group veto
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Acyclic choice and group veto
zbMATH Open document ID: 0575.90006
DOI: 10.1007/BF00437313
author: B. George
published in: Social Choice and Welfare
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The Arrow Impossibility Theorem assumes transitivity. Acyclicity is a more appropriate rationality condition for collective decision procedures. Many impossibility theorems for acyclic choice need to assume that there are more alternatives than individuals. In this paper we show that by considering circumstances under which groups (or coalitions) have veto it is possible to prove impossibility theorems without making such an assumption. Our results extend recent theorems by \textit{J. H. Blau} and \textit{R. Deb} [Econometrica 45, 871-879 (1977; Zbl 0362.90002)] and \textit{D. H. Blair} and \textit{R. A. Pollak} [ibid. 50, 931-943 (1982; Zbl 0483.90009)].
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3920155
zbMATH Keywords: collective decision procedures
zbMATH Keywords: acyclic choice
zbMATH Keywords: veto
zbMATH Keywords: impossibility theorems
Wikidata QID: Q57919817
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Acyclic Collective Choice Rules
cites work: Social Decision Functions and the Veto
cites work: k-Monotone Social Decision Functions and the Veto
cites work: The structure of social decision functions
cites work: General Possibility Theorems for Group Decisions
cites work: Social Choice Theory: A Re-Examination
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3920155