Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Pareto optimality and the decisive power structure with expansion consistency conditions
zbMATH Open document ID: 0578.90003
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90049-3
author: Taradas Bandyopadhyay
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Let X be a finite set of social states (at least four), and N a finite set of voters (at least two). Let C be a social choice function satisfying the independence condition and Pareto optimality. C satisfies strong dominance if C(B)\(\subseteq C(A)\cap B\), where A and B are subsets of X, and B contains exactly two elements. The main result is that such a strongly dominant C has a dictator.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B14
zbMATH DE Number: 3926579
zbMATH Keywords: independence condition
zbMATH Keywords: Pareto optimality
zbMATH Keywords: strong dominance
zbMATH Keywords: dictator
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(85)90049-3
OpenAlex ID: W2080909868
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926579