Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Game theoretic analysis of a bankruptcy problem from the Talmud
zbMATH Open document ID: 0578.90100
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90102-4
author: M. Maschler
author: Robert J. Aumann
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: The problem considered is how to divide an estate among creditors whose total claims exceed the value of the estate. A frequent solution in modern law is proportional division. The 2000-year old Babylonian Talmud prescribes, for three different bankruptcy problems, solutions which are not always proportional division. In the present paper a rationale for these solutions not involving game theory is given in terms of the Talmudic principle of equal division of the contested amount. This rationale leads to a unique solution for all bankruptcy problems, and it is then shown that this solution always coincides with the nucleolus when the problem is viewed as a coalitional game.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
zbMATH DE Number: 3926676
zbMATH Keywords: kernel
zbMATH Keywords: pre-kernel coalition
zbMATH Keywords: fair allocation
zbMATH Keywords: divide an estate among creditors
zbMATH Keywords: proportional division
zbMATH Keywords: Talmud
zbMATH Keywords: bankruptcy problems
zbMATH Keywords: nucleolus
Wikidata QID: Q56388115
reviewed by: Gerald A. Heuer
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(85)90102-4
OpenAlex ID: W1989936306
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3926676