Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for information exchange
zbMATH Open document ID: 0581.90007
DOI: 10.1016/0165-4896(83)90067-7
author: Akira Okada
published in: Mathematical Social Sciences
publication date: 1983-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper investigates the coalition formation of oligopolistic firms for exchanges of information about their cost functions in a game- theoretical framework. An oligopolistic market under uncertainty is considered in which each firm knows its own cost function but not those of all the others. The following results are shown. It is profitable for each firm to exchange the information about cost functions with other firms. When the uncertainty levels of the cost functions of all firms are symmetric, it is of common interest for them to exchange their information by forming the grand coalition. On the other hand, when their uncertainty levels are highly asymmetric, firms possessing less uncertain cost functions come into conflict with one another when exchanging information exclusively with the most uncertain firms. As a result, more than one coalition may be formed among firms.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A40
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3930670
zbMATH Keywords: market structure
zbMATH Keywords: noncooperative game
zbMATH Keywords: equilibrium point
zbMATH Keywords: coalition formation
zbMATH Keywords: oligopolistic firms
zbMATH Keywords: exchanges of information
zbMATH Keywords: game- theoretical framework
zbMATH Keywords: market under uncertainty
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0165-4896(83)90067-7
OpenAlex ID: W2025631350
cites work: Games with Incomplete Information Played by ‘Bayesian’ Players, Part III. The Basic Probability Distribution of the Game
cites work: A simple model of imperfect competition where 4 are few and 6 are many
cites work: On coalition formation: A game-theoretical approach
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930670