Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Contracts without memory in multiperiod agency models
zbMATH Open document ID: 0579.90014
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90095-X
author: John C. Fellingham
author: D. Paul Newman
author: Yoon S. Suh
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B62
zbMATH DE Number: 3928668
zbMATH Keywords: optimal multiperiod contracts
zbMATH Keywords: repeated agency game
zbMATH Keywords: memory contract
zbMATH Keywords: moral hazard
zbMATH Keywords: preference separability
zbMATH Keywords: domain additivity
MaRDI profile type: Publication
cites work: Information and Incentives: The Agency Information Problem
cites work: An Analysis of the Principal-Agent Problem
cites work: Optimal incentive contracts with imperfect information
cites work: Q4180077
cites work: Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
cites work: Monitoring Cooperative Agreements in a Repeated Principal-Agent Relationship
cites work: Repeated Moral Hazard
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3928668