Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Existence of equilibrium for Walrasian endowment games
zbMATH Open document ID: 0582.90009
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90097-3
author: Zvi Safra
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
full work available at URL: TEL-AVIV-FSWP-056.pdf
review text: Suppose that, in an exchange economy, the Walrasian prices and the corresponding equilibrium allocations are calculated with respect to the data declared by the traders. These data are: traders' initial endowments and their preferences. It is well known [\textit{L. Hurwicz}, Decision Organization, Vol. in Honor of Jacob Marschak, Studies Math. Managerial Economics 12, 297-236 (1972; Zbl 0254.90009) or \textit{A. Postlewaite}, Rev. Econ. Stud. 46, 255-262 (1979; Zbl 0409.90014)] that traders may gain by declaring the data different from the true ones. The reviewed paper studies the game with finitely many players in which players- traders' strategies are just declarations of their endowments, generally (though not necessarily) not exceeding the true endowments; special emphasis is given to the existence of Nash equilibria in such games. In particular, the author considers sequences of exchange economies \(E_ k\) with finitely many traders, tending to an exchange economy E with a continuum of traders and investigates the assumptions guaranteeing that a competitive equilibrium for E is a limit of a sequence of Nash equilibria for \(E_ k\), or vice versa.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A10
zbMATH DE Number: 3932728
zbMATH Keywords: endowment manipulation
zbMATH Keywords: exchange economy
zbMATH Keywords: finitely many players
zbMATH Keywords: existence of Nash equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: sequences of exchange economies
zbMATH Keywords: competitive equilibrium
Wikidata QID: Q57925850
reviewed by: Andrzej Wieczorek
MaRDI profile type: Publication
OpenAlex ID: W1976496787
cites work: Economies with a Finite Set of Equilibria
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cites work: Equilibrium allocations of Walrasian preference games
cites work: Manipulation via Endowments
cites work: The Incentives for Price-Taking Behavior in Large Exchange Economies
cites work: The limit points of monopolistic competition
cites work: Q5557123
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3932728