An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: An axiomatization of the core of cooperative games without side payments
zbMATH Open document ID: 0581.90102
DOI: 10.1016/0304-4068(85)90020-5
author: Bezalel Peleg
published in: Journal of Mathematical Economics
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Let \(M\) be a set of \(m\) players, \(m\geq 3\), and let \(\Gamma\) be the set of all (finite) games (without side payments) that have a non-empty core. When \(M\) is finite, the following four (independent) axioms fully characterize the core on \(\Gamma\) : (i) non-emptiness, (ii) individual rationality, (iii) the reduced game property, and (iv) the converse reduced game property. If \(M\) is infinite, then the converse reduced game property is redundant.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A12
zbMATH DE Number: 3930765
zbMATH Keywords: axiomatization
zbMATH Keywords: without side payments
zbMATH Keywords: core
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0304-4068(85)90020-5
OpenAlex ID: W1986823232
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3930765