The emergence of some of the nonlogical paradoxes of the theory of sets, 1903-1908
The author calls ''nonlogical'' those paradoxes ''not involving logical or mathematical terms but containing some reference to thought, language or symbolism''. The first among such paradoxes was the one discovered by G. G. Berry and communicated to Russell by a letter in 1904. The original formulation of Berry's paradox is presented. A detailed survey of events related to Zermelo's Axiom of Choice is given [see also \textit{G. H. Moore}, Zermelo's Axiom of Choice: Its origins, development, and influence (1982; Zbl 0497.01005) and \textit{F. A. Medvedev}, The early history of the Axiom of Choice (Russian) (1982)], as well as a review of König's and Dixon's paradoxes. The paper contains a lot of interesting facts and useful conclusions on the subject, and an extensive bibliography.
scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3946078