The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem
zbMATH Open document ID: 0594.90002
DOI: 10.1016/0022-0531(85)90106-1
author: Alvin E. Roth
published in: Journal of Economic Theory
publication date: 1985-01-01T00:00:00Z
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B68
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B08
zbMATH DE Number: 3956755
zbMATH Keywords: two-sided matching markets
zbMATH Keywords: college admissions problem
zbMATH Keywords: stable matching procedure
zbMATH Keywords: dominant strategy
zbMATH Keywords: true preferences
Wikidata QID: Q56564680
MaRDI profile type: Publication
full work available at URL: 0022-0531(85)90106-1
OpenAlex ID: W1985899049
cites work: Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm
cites work: College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage
cites work: Job Matching, Coalition Formation, and Gross Substitutes
cites work: The Economics of Matching: Stability and Incentives
cites work: Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem
cites work: Stability and Polarization of Interests in Job Matching
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3956755