Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information
zbMATH Open document ID: 0594.90008
DOI: 10.1007/BF01229301
published in: Journal of Economics
publication date: 1986-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: This paper is concerned with the dual relation between Cournot and Bertrand equilibria under imperfect information, by using a nonsymmetric duopoly model with product differentiation and/or cost differences. The Cournot equilibrium is characterized as the Nash equilibrium in quantities and the Bertrand equilibrium as the one in prices. There exist two different sources of uncertainty in contrast to many current models, in which there is essentially one source of uncertainty except measurement errors. It is shown that the combined force of physical and stochastic interactions between the firms play a key role in measuring the value of additional information and in examining the incentives for revealing information. This paper also discusses the efficiency of Bertrand competition as compared with Cournot competition. The results obtained in this paper go beyond those of earlier papers such as Novshek and Sonnenschein, Clarke, Gal-Or, Sakai, and Vives. There are many directions in which one can further extend the analysis of the paper on the role of information in an oligopoly market.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B50
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91B24
zbMATH DE Number: 3956761
zbMATH Keywords: Cournot and Bertrand equilibria
zbMATH Keywords: imperfect information
zbMATH Keywords: nonsymmetric duopoly model
zbMATH Keywords: product differentiation
zbMATH Keywords: oligopoly market
author: Yasuhiro Sakai
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01229301
OpenAlex ID: W1988156280
description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3956761