Informational aspects of a class of subjective games of incomplete information: static case
type: Item
instance of: scholarly article
title: Informational aspects of a class of subjective games of incomplete information: static case
zbMATH Open document ID: 0595.90105
DOI: 10.1007/BF00939442
published in: Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
publication date: 1987-01-01T00:00:00Z
review text: Subjective games of incomplete information are formulated where some of the key assumptions of Bayesian games of incomplete information are relaxed. The issues arising because of the new formulation are studied in the context of a class of non-zero-sum, two-person games, where each player has a different model of the game. The static game is investigated in this note. It is shown that the properties of the static subjective game are different from those of the corresponding Bayesian game. Counterintuitive outcomes of the game can occur because of the different beliefs of the players. These outcomes may lead the players to realize the differences in their models.
Mathematics Subject Classification ID: 91A05
zbMATH DE Number: 3959172
zbMATH Keywords: subjective games of incomplete information
zbMATH Keywords: Bayesian games
zbMATH Keywords: public information
zbMATH Keywords: private information
zbMATH Keywords: secret information
zbMATH Keywords: value of information
author: Demosthenis Teneketzis
author: David A. Castanon
MaRDI profile type: Publication
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full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00939442
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description: scientific article; zbMATH DE number 3959172